Substance dualism Flashcards

Question

What is meant by the term ‘conceivability?’

Answer 1

Conceivability means capable of being imagined or grasped mentally without incoherence or contradiction.

Answer 2

The problem of other minds is the question of how we can know that there are minds other than our own, given that our experience of other minds (if they exist) is through behaviour. While we experience our own minds directly, we cannot experience other people’s mental states directly (if they exist).

Answer 3

Substance dualism is the theory that there are two types of substance, mental substance (mind) and physical substance (body/matter). A substance is ontologically independent – it does not depend upon anything else in order to exist. Substance is also the bearer of properties and can persist through change. Substance Dualism therefore claims that minds are not bodies, parts of bodies, or properties of bodies. Substance Dualism can either claim that the mind and body, as two distinct substances, causally interact (interactionist forms) or do not interact (epiphenomenalist forms).

Answer 4

In his indivisibility argument, Descartes defines the mind as something which only thinks and is not 'extended', and the body as something which is only extended but does not think. My mind is essentially unified and therefore not divisible. The faculties of willing, perceiving, imagining and so on are not parts –it is one and the same mind that wills, perceives, imagines etc. Conversely, my body is not essentially unified and is divisible – it has parts, e.g. I can quite literally lose a hand or a foot. Descartes claims that these two ideas of mind and body are clearly and distinctly conceived. Descartes uses Leibniz's law of the indiscernability of identicals to conclude that since identical substances share the same properties and mind and body have different properties (the body is divisible while the mind is not), mind and body must be distinct substances.

Answer 5

In his Indivisibility argument, Descartes claims that while the body is divisible, the mind is not. We will, think, imagine with the whole of our minds, not a literal part. However, cases of mental illness, e.g. multiple personality syndrome might be used to suggest that the mind can be divided. In such cases, it seems that some ‘parts’ of the person’s mind are unable to communicate with other ‘parts’. Theories of the difference between consciousness and the unconscious suggest something similar: people may believe or desire one thing consciously, and the opposite unconsciously. So it makes sense to talk about ‘parts’ of the mind. In this way, the view that the mental is divisible in some sense challenges Descartes’ indivisibility argument and his claim that the mind and the body are distinct substances as they do not share the same properties.

Answer 6

In his Indivisibility argument, Descartes claims that while the body is divisible, the mind is not, and that because mind and body do not share the exact same properties, they cannot be identical and must exist as distinct substances. However, there are cases where the physical is not divisible, e.g. electromagnetic fields or gravitational fields. We cannot halve a gravitational or electromagnetic field. This would mean that divisibility is not an essential property of the physical and that Descartes’ indivisibility argument is undermined – he can no longer claim that mind and the body are distinct substances because they do not share the same properties – it seems that indivisibility can be a property of the physical, as well as the mental.

Answer 7

We can object that the argument from indivisibility does not prove that the mind is a substance. Even if we accept the premise that the mind is indivisible, we can postulate that rather than being a substance, the mind is constituted by mental properties. Properties are not spatially divisible, for example the property of temperature. So the mind understood as mental properties would be indivisible, and we would not need to say that the mind is a substance. Descartes therefore requires an additional argument to conclude that the mind is a substance rather than a property, rather than just assuming this to be the case.

Answer 8

n his conceivability argument, Descartes begins by claiming that we have separate clear and distinct ideas of the mind (as something that thinks and isn’t extended in space) and body (as something extended in space which doesn’t think). Descartes posits that if he can conceive of these ideas clearly and distinctly (and God would not deceive us about our clear and distinct ideas), God is able to bring these two distinct things into existence separately – in other words, it is conceivable that mind and body exist independently of one another. Descartes then claims that because it is conceivable that mind and body exist independently of one another, it is also metaphysically possible. This is because God is able to bring into existence that which can be conceived without contradiction. From this metaphysical possibility, Descartes infers that mind and body must exist as two distinct substances, thus supporting substance dualism.

Answer 9

In his conceivability argument, Descartes claims that we can conceive of the mind existing independent of the body and that we have a clear and distinct idea of the mind as a distinct substance. The objection that the mind without body is not conceivable suggests that we may be confused when conceiving of the mind as distinct from the body or that we may be misinformed, i.e. perhaps there is a way that the mind is somehow dependent upon the body which we are not aware of. If this is the case, then we would not have, in Descartes’ terms, a clear and distinct idea of the mind as a distinct substance. We may not be able to tell, just by rational reflection, whether we have a clear and distinct idea of the mind as a distinct substance. A theory like Philosophical Behaviourism goes further with this objection by claiming that it is in fact inconsistent to conceive of the mind without body given that to talk of mental states is to talk of how something behaves, i.e. a mental state is something only a physical substance (body) can have.

Answer 10

In his conceivability argument, Descartes infers metaphysical possibility from conceivability (logical possibility) in claiming that because it is conceivable that mind can exist independent of body, it is possible that mind exists independent of body. Descartes believes that this inference is justified as he has clear and distinct ideas of mind and body. However, we can object that what is conceivable may not be metaphysically possible with the example of the Masked Man fallacy. This fallacy shows that although we may be able to conceive that ‘two’ people are distinct, we cannot infer that they are distinct. While it may be logically possible that my father is not the masked man who robbed the bank, if my father is indeed the masked man, then it is metaphysically impossible that my father and the masked man are two distinct people (given the nature/identity of my father/the masked man). Not everything that is conceivable is metaphysically possible and this could apply to the proposition that mind can exist without body.

Answer 11

In his conceivability argument, Descartes infers from the metaphysical possibility of mind and body existing as separate and distinct substances, that they do exist as separate and distinct substances, i.e. that substance dualism is true. But what is metaphysically possible does not necessarily tell us anything about the actual world. Many things are possible that are not actual, e.g. the speed of light could have been slightly different. Moreover, even if we accept the metaphysical possibility of mind and body existing as separate and distinct substances, they could in fact be the case that the mind exists as mental properties rather than mental substance. In order to establish substance dualism, Descartes would need to show that it is metaphysically impossible for mind and body to exist as the same substance. This is because what is metaphysically impossible cannot exist in reality so this would tell us about the actual world, i.e. that mind and body must exist as separate and distinct substances.

Answer 12

To respond to the problem of other minds, we can say that the existence of other minds is the best hypothesis for why people behave as they do. This argument does not appeal to the first-personal experience of having a mind nor does it draw an analogy between my behaviour and that of others’. Instead, the question is third-personal – what hypothesis best explains people’s behaviour in general? This response employs a standard form of theoretical scientific reasoning – inference to the best explanation. We observe others displaying behaviours, e.g. speaking, responding to stimuli, that are similar to our own behaviours (which we explain by reference to our mental states). The best hypothesis for explaining the behaviour of others is that they have minds, similar to our own, and that these minds cause their actions. As part of this response, ‘minds’ are understood as mental states that respond to the environment and cause behaviour, e.g. the mental state ‘pain’ makes you respond quickly to prevent further damage. Attributing minds to others is the most reasonable explanation of their behaviour, and allows us to predict and understand their behaviour in a way that an alternative hypothesis (e.g. that they are robots) cannot.

Answer 13

The challenge posed by the phenomenology (our conscious experience of) our mental life argues that ED’s claim that mental states are causally inert is deeply counter-intuitive given our experience of mental states as involving causal connections, both psychological and psycho-physical. In other words, we experience mental states like feeling pain as causing other mental states, e.g. the belief that you are in a lot of pain, and as causing physical events like behaviour, e.g. taking a painkiller. The phenomenology of our mental life therefore involves everyday experience of such causal connections and to deny this would be very counter-intuitive. This challenge therefore undermines ED’s central claim that mental states are merely epiphenomena and do not cause either physical events or mental events.

Answer 14

The challenge posed by introspective self-knowledge claims that epiphenomenalist dualism cannot explain how we gain knowledge of our own minds through introspection (direct and immediate awareness of one’s own mental states), e.g. how do I know that I am in pain? We tend to think that you know that you are in pain because your belief that you are in pain is caused by the sensation of pain (a mental state). But if ED is true and our beliefs about our mental states are not in fact caused by those mental states (since mental properties are causally inert) then my mental state of pain causes nothing. If ED is true, then it possible to have the belief ‘I am in pain’ without having the mental state of pain. My beliefs about my own mind would therefore be unjustified and unreliable. If ED is true and mental properties are causally inert, then we cannot know our own minds and we cannot gain self-knowledge through introspection.

Answer 15

The problem of other minds is the question of how we can know that there are minds other than our own. While we can each experience our own minds directly, e.g. we can know what we want or believe via introspection, we cannot directly experience other people’s mental states. All we have to go on is their behaviour which is expressed through their bodies. The problem of other minds is a particular issue for substance dualism – if minds and bodies are entirely independent substances, then how do I infer from seeing a body that there is a mind ‘attached’? The two substances, according to this theory, exist independently of one another. We have no way of ruling out that other ‘people’ - other bodies- are just sophisticated machines without minds. This challenges the theory because we want to say that other people have minds but it is not obvious how we can do this if we follow substance dualism.

Answer 16

The argument from analogy responds to the problem of other minds by claiming that we can use the behaviour of other people to infer that they also have minds. Since our bodies and behaviours are similar to those of others, we can infer by analogy that their similar behaviours are also caused by mental states. The first version of the argument runs as follows: P1. I have a mind. P2. I know from experience that my mental states cause my behaviour. P3. Other people have bodies similar to mine and behave similarly to me in similar situations. C1. Therefore, by analogy, their behaviour has the same type of cause as behaviour, namely mental states. C2. Therefore, other people have minds. To avoid the objection that the conclusion is based on a single case (and that this could just be a special case, i.e. only I have a mind), a second version of the argument was formulated in order to address the problem of other minds: P1. This behaviour has a mental cause. P2. That behaviour has a mental cause. P3. That third behaviour (etc.) has a mental cause. C1. Therefore, many behaviours have a mental cause (I know this from my own experience). P4. Other people exhibit the same types of behaviour as cited above. C2. Therefore, those behaviours also have mental causes. C3. Therefore, other people have minds.

Substance dualism Flashcards

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