Property Dualism Flashcards
(15 cards)
What is property dualism (5m)
The theory that there is only one kind of substance within is physical substance, but two ontologically fundamental kinds of property: physical properties and mental properties, specifically phenomenal properties of conscious. Phenomenal properties of consciousness are neither reducible to nor supervene on phyiscal properties
Explain the zombie Arguement for property dualism
The argument for property dualism that if consciousness were identical to some physical properties, it would not be metaphysically possible for something to have that physical property without consciousness. However, the zombie argument claims:
1) philosophical zombies (physical and functional duplicates of us which lack phenomenal consciousness) are conceivable, and so 2) philosophical zombies are metaphysically possible. Therefore, 3) consciousness is non-physical (phenomenal properties of consciousness are neither identical to nor supervene on physical properties) and physicalism is false and property dualism is true.
Explain how substance dualism differs from property dualism
Substance dualism claims that mind and body exist as two ontologically independent entities (substances) and that physical properties are properties of physical substance and mental properties are properties of mental substance. Property dualism in contrast maintains that there is only one type of substance (physical) and does not claim that mental substance exists. Property dualists claim that two distinct kinds of properties exist: physical properties which are properties of physical substance and mental properties, specifically phenomenal properties of consciousness, which, though correlated with physical properties, are not ontologically dependent on them, ie. Phenomenal properties of consciousness are neither identical to nor supervene on the physical.
· Explain the natural selection objection to epiphenomenalist forms of property dualism
The natural selection objection to epiphenomenalist property dualism challenges the theory’s claim that the phenomenal properties of consciousness are causally inert (with no effect on physical properties or other phenomenal properties) and are to be understood as epiphenomena, i.e. by-products of physical processes. The objection questions how and why we would have evolved to have such epiphenomenal properties given that the theory of evolution and natural selection (which is widely accepted) that species evolve traits which causally contribute to survival and reproduction. EPD’s claim that phenomenal properties of consciousness are causally inert directly conflicts with our best account of the origin of consciousness – this would mean that we had somehow evolved traits which do not causally contribute to survival or reproduction.
What is a possible world?
A way of talking about how things could be. Saying that something is possible is saying that it is true in some possible world. Saying that something is impossible is saying that it is false in all possible worlds.
What is metaphysical necessity?
Something is metaphysically necessary if it is true in all possible worlds.
· What is a philosophical zombie?
A physical-functional duplicate of a human being that lacks phenomenal consciousness and is conceivable.
Outline the knowledge/Mary argument for property dualism
Frank Jackson’s knowledge argument can be used to support property dualism (the theory that while only physical substance exists, there are two ontologically fundamental kinds of properties- physical properties and phenomenal properties of consciousness which are not reducible to nor supervenient on physical properties). Jackson presents the thought experiment of Mary the neuroscientist who has lived her entire life in a black and white room.
P1. If Physicalism is true, then all the facts are physical facts.
P2. In her black and white room, Mary knows all the physical facts.
P3. When Mary sees the tomato, she learns a new fact: “seeing red has this phenomenal property in humans”
P4. Some facts are not physical facts (some facts are phenomenal facts).
C. Therefore Physicalism is false.
If physicalism is false, this means that not everything that exists is physical or supervenes on the physical. This would then support property dualism’s claim that phenomenal properties of consciousness are not reducible to physical properties nor do they supervene on physical properties.
what is property dualism
The theory that there is only one kind of substance, physical substance, but two ontologically fundamental kinds of property – physical properties and mental properties. Mental properties, specifically the phenomenal properties of consciousness are neither reducible to nor supervene on physical properties. Interactionist forms of property dualism claim that both kinds of properties causally interact with one another while epiphenomenalist forms claim that the phenomenal properties of consciousness are causally inert and do not cause physical or mental events.
· Explain the natural selection objection to epiphenomenalist forms of property dualism
The natural selection objection to epiphenomenalist property dualism challenges the theory’s claim that the phenomenal properties of consciousness are causally inert (with no effect on physical properties or other phenomenal properties) and are to be understood as epiphenomena, i.e. by-products of physical processes. The objection questions how and why we would have evolved to have such epiphenomenal properties given that the theory of evolution and natural selection (which is widely accepted) that species evolve traits which causally contribute to survival and reproduction. EPD’s claim that phenomenal properties of consciousness are causally inert directly conflicts with our best account of the origin of consciousness – this would mean that we had somehow evolved traits which do not causally contribute to survival or reproduction.
Explain the philosophical zombie argument and the response that what is conceivable may not be metaphysically possible ( 12m give second half)
The physicalist can respond by arguing that even if zombies are conceivable, this does not entail that they are metaphysically possible, thereby attacking premise 2 of the zombie argument. If Physicalism is true, then zombies are in fact metaphysically impossible. This is
because if phenomenal properties just are certain physical and/or functional properties, then you cannot have these physical and/or functional properties without phenomenal consciousness. This is due to the nature of metaphysical necessity – if phenomenal properties of consciousness are identical to physical and/or functional properties, then this would be true in all possible worlds, meaning that philosophical zombies would be metaphysically impossible. This objection from the physicalist therefore undermines the second premise of the zombie argument.
Explain the philosophical zombie argument and the response that philosophical zombies are not conceivable
The zombie argument is a conceivability argument for property dualism which argues that if consciousness were identical to some physical properties, it would not be metaphysically possible for something to have that physical property without consciousness. However, 1) philosophical zombies (physical and functional duplicates of us which lack phenomenal consciousness) are conceivable, and so 2) philosophical zombies are metaphysically possible. Therefore, 3) consciousness is non-physical and physicalism is false.
The physicalist can respond to this argument by attacking premise 1 and arguing that zombies are not in fact conceivable. This objection claims that the only reason we may think zombies are conceivable is because we are not thinking clearly or we lack relevant information. If we had a complete analysis of consciousness, we would see that consciousness can be completely explained in physical and functional terms. The objection argues that:
P1. If physicalism is true, then phenomenal properties are physical properties realising particular functional roles.
C1. So, a physical and functional duplicate of a person with consciousness has phenomenal consciousness.
P2. A physical and functional duplicate of a person with consciousness cannot both have and lack phenomenal consciousness.
C2. Therefore, if physicalism is true, zombies are inconceivable.
By showing that zombies are inconceivable, this objection from the physicalist attacks the first premise of the zombie argument for property dualism.
Explain the philosophical zombie argument and the response that what is metaphysically possible may not actually be the case.
The physicalist can respond to this argument by attacking the inference from P3 to the conclusion (zombies are metaphysically possible and therefore actually the case). The physicalist argues that, at best, the zombie argument shows that in another possible world, physical properties and phenomenal properties are distinct. This does not necessarily entail that these properties are distinct in the actual world. It could be the case that physicalism is true in the actual world but property dualism is true in a different possible world. In other words, the zombie argument only shows that property dualism is possible, not that it is true.
It does not show that the key claim of property dualism – that physical properties and phenomenal properties are distinct and both ontologically fundamental – is true.
· Explain the knowledge/Mary argument for property dualism AND the response that Mary does not gain new propositional knowledge but does gain new ability knowledge (only give 2nd half)
The knowledge argument claims that Mary gains new propositional knowledge (knowledge-that) of a phenomenal fact “seeing red has this phenomenal property in humans” and that subsequently not all facts are physical facts. David Lewis responds to the argument in a way that is consistent with physicalism (i.e. that all facts are physical facts) but also explains our intuition that Mary does indeed learn something new when she leaves the room. He claims that Mary does not gain any new propositional knowledge when she sees the tomato but instead that she gains new ability knowledge (knowledge-how), i.e. the ability to recognise red, the ability to recall seeing red, the ability to imagine seeing red. This kind of knowledge is only possible through actually encountering a red thing. By claiming that Mary gains ability knowledge rather than propositional knowledge, she does not gain any new knowledge of facts. The only facts Mary is in possession of are physical facts, and physicalism is preserved. The knowledge argument does not therefore succeed in showing physicalism to be false nor in establishing property dualism.
· Explain the knowledge/Mary argument for property dualism AND the response that Mary does not gain new propositional knowledge but does gain new acquaintance knowledge
The knowledge argument claims that Mary gains new propositional knowledge (knowledge-that) of a phenomenal fact “seeing red has this phenomenal property in humans” and that subsequently not all facts are physical facts. The physicalist responds to the argument in a way that is consistent with physicalism (i.e. that all facts are physical facts) but also explains our intuition that Mary does indeed learn something new when she leaves the room. The physicalist claims that Mary does not gain any new propositional knowledge when she sees the tomato but instead that she gains new acquaintance knowledge (knowledge-of) and becomes directly aware of red. In order to give this response, the physicalist must assume that mental properties including phenomenal properties are identical to physical brain properties. Mary then gains new direct acquaintance with a physical brain fact she already knew. She therefore gains a new relationto a fact she already knew ‘seeing red (a brain state has the phenomenal property [redness] which is actually brain property P)’. Before she had seen red, she knew this fact from the outside. After seeing red, she becomes directly acquainted with it from the inside – as Patricia Churchland emphasises, physicalism is complete but Mary’s brain needed to undergo the processes the theory describes as constituting colour experience. By claiming that Mary gains acquaintance knowledge rather than propositional knowledge, she does not gain any new knowledge of facts. The only facts Mary is in possession of are physical facts, and physicalism is preserved. The knowledge argument does not therefore succeed in showing physicalism to be false nor in establishing property dualism.
