MBTIT Flashcards
(9 cards)
· What is ontological reduction?
Ontological reduction is where things in one domain are identical to or can be completely explained in terms of things in another domain
· What does MBTIT claim about mental states?
MBTIT claims that mental states are type-identical and ontologically reducible to physical brain states (eg the mental state of pain is identical to c-fibres firing)
Explain how the claims made by eliminative materialism and type-identity theory differ (5m)
Eliminative materialism and type-identity theory differ in their views on 1) the existence and nature of mental properties, 2) the concepts used to refer to mental properties, and 3) the meaning and veracity of statements about mental properties. EM argues that at least some mental properties (as understood by folk psychology) do not exist, e.g. Intentionality, and as such we should eliminate folk psychological concepts of those mental properties. Statements about the mind which rely on these folk-psychological concepts are therefore false according to EM. Type I-T however asserts that those mental properties do exist and that they are ontologically reducible to neuro-physical properties, i.e. they are identical to specific brain properties. Type- IT therefore retains the folk-psychological concepts of those mental properties as they pick out neuro-physical properties. With regards to statements about the mind, Type-IT views statements that use folk-psychological concepts as making claims that are meaningful and true.
· Explain the differences between the empirical and a priori forms of the argument from multiple realizability objcetion to MBTIT (5m)
The argument from multiple realisability claims that mental properties are not identical to physical properties because the same mental state can be realised by different physical properties. The empirical and a priori forms of this argument differ in how they support this claim. The empirical form relies on empirical observations and findings from neuroscience to claim that the same mental state can be realised by different brain structures, e.g. observing pain-behaviour in dogs or examining the neurology of dogs. The a priori form, however, relies on conceptual analysis and conceivability to support the claim that the same mental state can be realised by different brain structures, even without any empirical evidence. The a priori form argues that 1) it is conceivable, and therefore possible for a being with a different physical constitution from ours to have the same thoughts or sensations, 2) it is inconceivable and therefore impossible for something to both have and not have a certain property, therefore 3. mental properties cannot be identical to physical properties. The empirical and a priori forms of the argument also differ in terms of their scope, while the empirical form is limited to available empirical evidence, the a priori form can explore possibilities beyond current science.
· Explain one response to the multiple realisability objection to MBTIT (5m)
Lewis responds to this objection by invoking the notion of species-relativity regarding our concepts of mental states. Our everyday concept of pain is actually the concept pain-in-humans - this is the concept which is used in MBTIT’s arguments but not explicitly mentioned, i.e. species-relativity is implicitly built into MBTIT. When we consider other species and think about a dog in pain, we implicitly use the concept pain-in-dogs. By pointing out that our concepts of pain are relative to species, Lewis allows MBTIT to preserve their original claim by making what is implicit explicit: Pain-in-humans is type-identical to human brain type c-fibres while pain-in-dogs is type-identical to some dog brain state type. This would mean that Putnam’s multiple realisability objection that ‘It is empirically plausible that some instances of M are not instances of B (they are instances of different, non-human brain properties)’ is no longer possible.
· Explain one objection from the dualist to mind-brain type-identity theory
MBTIT claims that mental properties are type-identical to neuro-physical properties, in other words, that the mind is identical (ontologically reducible) to the brain. We can object to MBTIT here using Descartes’ indivisibility argument for substance dualism. In his indivisibility argument, Descartes defines the mind as not extended in space, essentially unified, and therefore indivisible. The body, by contrast, he defines as not essentially unified, spatially extended, and therefore divisible. Descartes uses Leibniz’s law of the indiscernibility of identicals to conclude that since identical substances share the same properties and mind and body have different properties (the body is divisible while the mind is not), mind and body must be distinct substances. As part of the body, the brain is spatially extended and divisible – we can slice it up into sections - but the mind is indivisible. Again, following Leibniz’s law, the mind cannot therefore be identical to the brain, since they have different properties, and this is contrary to MBTIT’s main claim.
· Explain how the knowledge argument as a dualist argument can be used as an objection to mind-brain type-identity theory
MBTIT is a reductive physicalist theory of mind which claims that mental states are type-identical and ontologically reducible to physical brain states, e.g. seeing red is identical to brain state P. On MBTIT’s account, if Mary knows everything, i.e. all the physical facts, about the brain processes involved in colour perceptions, then she knows everything about colour perceptions since, e.g. the physical brain state P is identical to the mental state ‘seeing red’. Since mental states are type-identical to brain states, this means that every instance of brain state P is identical to the mental state ‘seeing red’. The knowledge argument can be used as an objection to MBTIT to show that mental states are not type-identical to physical brain states. When Mary leaves the room and, as Jackson argues, gains new propositional knowledge (‘this is what it’s like to see red’) of a new phenomenal fact ‘redness has this phenomenal property’, this shows that she did not know everything about colour experience previously, as physical facts do not account for the knowledge she has gained about seeing red and a different kind of fact is required. By extension, this shows that mental properties cannot be identical to physical brain properties and that MBTIT must be false.
· Explain how the zombie argument as a dualist argument can be used an objection to mind-brain type-identity theory
MBTIT is a reductive physicalist theory of mind which claims that mental states are type-identical and ontologically reducible to physical brain states, e.g. pain is identical to c-fires firing. The theory claims that mental states are type-identical to brain states, this means that every instance of pain is identical to c-fibres firing. On MBTIT’s account, phenomenal properties are ontologically reducible to certain physical brain properties. If this were the case, then philosophical zombies (physical and functional duplicates of us lacking phenomenal consciousness) would be metaphysically impossible. But the zombie argument claims that philosophical zombies are conceivable, and therefore metaphysically possible, and that therefore phenomenal properties of consciousness are not reducible to physical properties. This would mean that MBTIT is false.
ex[plain the multiple realizability objection to MBTIT
This objection from Putnam claims that one and the same mental state can be ‘realised’ (have its function performed) by different physical states. For example, we observe behaviours associated with pain in different species with different physical brain states, e.g. a dog can display pain behaviour and from this we can infer the dog has the mental state of pain despite not having human brain states. This suggests that the mental state pain is not type-identical to the physical human brain state c fibres firing. This is presented as an objection to MBTIT’s claim that mental states are type-identical to human physical brain states.
P1. If mental property type M is identical to human brain property type B, then any instance of M must be an instance of B
P2. Multiple Realisability Premise: It is empirically plausible that some instances of M are not instances of B (they are instances of different, non-human brain properties)
C1. Therefore: M-type is not identical to B-type
If mental states are not type-identical to human physical brain states, this undermines MBTIT’s key claim.
