Lecture 20 Flashcards
Sequential & semi-blind games
Sequential play - Player A goes without knowing what B will do. B goes second but knows what A has done first. Investment Game, Ultimatum Game, Dictator Game.
A and B both get $6. A decides how much to transfer to B and B gets 3x the amount that A transfers. B decides how much to transfer back to A.
Social dilemmas and framing effects
Participant’s choice may depend on name of game and roles - for ex. investment game vs. trust game, Wall St game vs. community game
Ultimatum game
A gets $10, decides how much to give to B. If B refuses, then no one gets anything. Normative model says that responder will accept anything greater than 0, but usually anything less than 20% is rejected - fairness/punishing unfairness. People do accept small offers from a computer
Ultimatum and the anchoring effect
Anchoring can impact how much money A will give B and how much B will accept
Dictator game
A gets $10 and chooses how to divide with B; B has no say. Usually this is lower than ultimatum game but still non-zero. There is still a concern for fairness
Mostly sequential & sort of aware games
Some sequential, some simultaneous. Limited communication - players aware of others’ actions to some extent; sometimes incentives to lie
Commons dilemmas
Common land for use of all, adding an animal gives one person a gain but losses are shared. Individually rational behavior is to add more animals, collectively rational is to limit the total. Can be without communication, cheap talk, full communication (must abide)
n-person dilemmas
Options x and y. Each individual better off doing x, society is better off doing y. if too few do y, resource collapses. Environment for example. Can be public goods dilemmas (giving) or resource dilemmas (taking)
