CCNA2 - Chapter 11 Flashcards

(24 cards)

1
Q

– easiest for hackers to deploy

A

Layer 2 attacks

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2
Q

prevents MAC address table overflow attacks
- PS limits the no. of valid MAC addresses allowed on a port. (admin manually configure MAC, dynamically learned)
- 1 only permitted MAC addresses, PS controls unauthorized access to the network

A

Enabling port security

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3
Q

command to enable port security

A

S1(config-if)# sw port-security
o If the port is set to dynamic auto (trunking on), the command above will be rejected

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4
Q

4 types of port security

A
  • aging
  • mac-address
  • maximum
  • violation
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5
Q

limit & learn MAC add

A
  • default = 1
  • max = depends on sw and IOS
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6
Q

3 ways learn MAC ADDRESS

A
  1. Manually configured
    S1(config-ig)# sw port-security mac-address [ma]
  2. Dynamically learned: current source MAC connected to the port is auto secured (not added in run config). Rebooted – port re-learn device’s MAC A
  3. Dynamically learned – sticky: Admin enable switch to 2 and stick them to run config
    S1(config-if)# sw port-security mac-address sticky
    * Save

Sh port-security int and sh port-security add – verify congurations

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7
Q

2 types of aging

A
  1. Absolute secure addresses on the port are deleted after the specified aging time
  2. Inactivity The secure addresses on the port are deleted if they are inactive for a specified time.

S1(config-if)# sw port-security aging {static | time time | type {absolute | inactivity}}

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8
Q

Port security violation modes

A
  1. Shutdown (D) – error-disabled state immediately, off LED, send syslog message
  2. Restrictport drops packets with unknown source addresses (counter to increment and generates a syslog message)
  3. Protect – least secure (no syslog message is sent)
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9
Q

ports in error-disabled state

A

Sh int – identifies the port status as err-disabled
Sh port-security intsecure-shutdown

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10
Q

Verify port security

A

Sh port-security – display port-security settings for all switches
Sh port-security interface – view
Sh run | begin int f0/19 – verify that MAC address are ‘sticking’ to the configuration
Sh port-security address – display all secure MAC addresses

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11
Q

is launched in one of three ways:
- Spoofing DTP messages from the attacking host (sw -> trunking mode)
o Attacker send traffic tagged w/ target vlan
- Introducing a rogue switch & enable trunk
o Attacker can access ALL vlans on the victim switch
- Double-tagging (d-encapsulated) attack
o Takes advantage of the way hardware on most switches operate

A

VLAN hopping attack

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12
Q

Steps to Mitigate VLAN Hopping Attacks

A
  1. Disable DTP (auto trunking) negotiation on non-trunking ports (sw mode)
  2. Disable unused ports & put them in unused vlan
  3. Manually enable trunk link on trunking port (sw mode trunk)
  4. Disable DTP negotiations on trunking port (sw nonegotiate)
  5. Set native vlan to a vlan other tan VLAN 1 (sw trunk native vlan vlan_no)
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13
Q

– attack tools such as Gobbler to create a Denial of Service (DoS) for connecting clients
- Can be effectively mitigated using port security. Gobbler = unique source MACaddress for each DHCP request sent
- Gobbler – configured to use the actuate int MAC add as the source ethernet add

A

DHCP starvation attack

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14
Q

– requires more protection
- Can be mitigated using DHCP snooping on trusted ports

A

DHCP spoofing attacks

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15
Q

filters DHCP messages and rate-limits DHCP traffic on untrusted ports
* Trusted sources
o Dev. Under admin control (sw, r, servers)
o Trusted int (trunk links, server p)
* Untrusted Source
o Dev outside the network & all access ports

A

DHCP snooping

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16
Q

– includes the source MAC add of device on an untrusted port & IP add assigned
- MAC & IP add are bound together
- Aka _________________________________

A

DHCP table
DHCP snooping binding table

17
Q

Steps to Implement DHCP Snooping

A
  1. Enable DHCP snooping (S1(config)# ip dhcp snooping)
  2. On trusted ports (S1(config-if)# ip dhcp snooping trust)
  3. On untrusted int (S1(config-if)# ip dhcp limit rate packets-per-second)
  4. Enable DHCP snooping by VLAN (S1(config)# ip dhcp snooping vlan)

S1# sh ip dhcp snooping – verify DHCP snooping settings
S1# s hip dhcp snooping binding – view the clients that have receive DHCP infos

18
Q

– requires DHCP snooping and helps prevent ARP attacks by
- Not relaying invalid ARP replies to other ports
- Verify each intercepted packet for a valid IP-to-MAC binding
- Drop & log ARP replies coming from invalid
- Error-disable the int if the configured DAI no of ARP packets is exceeded

A

Dynamic ARP Inspection (DAI)

19
Q

DAI Implementation Guidelines

A
  • Enable DHCP snooping globally
  • Enable DHCP snooping on selected VLANs
  • Enable DAI on selected VLANs
  • Configure trusted int for DHCP snooping & ARP inspection
    o Trusted (uplink ports that connected to other switches)
    o Untrusted ( all access ports)
20
Q

Destination, source & IP add

A

Destination MAC – checks the DM add in the Ethernet header against the target MAC add in ARP body
Source MAC – checks the SM add in the Ethernet header against the sender MAC address in the ARP body.
IP address - Checks the ARP body for invalid and unexpected IP addresses including addresses 0.0.0.0, 255.255.255.255, and all IP multicast addresses.

21
Q

PortFast and BPDU Guard

A

Portfast
- Immediately brings a port to the forwarding state from a blocking state, bypassing the listening and learning states
- Apply to all end-user access ports
BPDU Guard
- immediately error disables a port that receives a BPDU
- Like PortFast, BPDU guard should only be configured on interfaces attached to end devices

22
Q

Configure PortFast

A
  • Only enable portfast on access ports
  • Portfast on inter switch link = spanning-tree loop

On int – S1(config-if)# spanning-tree portfast
Globally - S1(config)# spanning-tree portfast default

23
Q

Verify PortFast

A

Verify PortFAst is enabled GLOBALLY
- Sh run | begin span
- Sh spanning-tree summary
Verify PortFAst is enabled in an INTERFACE
- Sh run int type/number
- Sh run int type/number detail

24
Q

Configure BPDU Guard

A
  • If a BPDU is received on a BPDU Guard enabled access port, the port is put into error-disabled state
  • This means the port is shut down and must be manually re-enabled or automatically recovered through the errdisable recovery cause secure_violation global command

On interface – S1(config-if)# spanning-tree bpduguard enable
Globally – S1(config)# spanning-tree bpduguard default