Week 9.2 - Crisis States and Violent Conflicts Flashcards
(153 cards)
1
Q
What followed radical neoliberal reforms in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) during the 1990s?
A
Many internecine violent conflicts broke out across the region
2
Q
What are recent examples of asymmetric global power being exercised?
A
The US and allies in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya; Russia in Ukraine; Israel in Palestine
3
Q
What has been the impact of asymmetric global power being exercised on global order?
A
They have undermined international law and increased global insecurity
4
Q
What trend has been observed in the arms industry?
A
Massive growth in arms trade and military aid with little international oversight
5
Q
How did the concept of ‘state fragility’ emerge in development discourse?
A
It evolved from ideas of “failed” and “rogue” states in the 1990s and gained prominence after 9/11
6
Q
What percentage of ODA went to fragile contexts by 2016?
A
67% according to the OECD
7
Q
What did the World Bank estimate for 2030 regarding poverty and fragility?
A
Over 50% of the extreme poor would reside in countries affected by fragility, conflict, and violence (FCV)
8
Q
What positive shifts occurred due to focus on fragile states?
A
Aid moved beyond “good performers,” with greater focus on state capacity, legitimacy, and service delivery
9
Q
What negative developments accompanied the shift of focus on fragile states?
A
Aid became securitised, distinctions between development and military aid were blurred, and neoliberal prescriptions remained dominant
10
Q
What was problematic about the DAC 2016 update to ODA?
A
It marked a reversal by allowing more military-linked aid to count as official development assistance
11
Q
What is the OECD’s 2007 definition of a fragile state?
A
A state lacking the political will and/or capacity to provide essential services for development, security, and rights
12
Q
How did the World Bank define fragile states in 2007?
A
As states with weak institutions, poor governance, instability, and ongoing or past severe conflict
13
Q
How does the World Bank operationalise fragility?
A
Using the CPIA score, with countries scoring below 3.2 considered fragile
14
Q
What is the mismatch in how the World Bank defines vs measures fragility?
A
Definitions focus on governance and violence, while operationalisation uses CPIA’s focus on neoliberal reform indicators
15
Q
What was CPIA originally designed for?
A
To allocate IDA grants, not to measure state fragility
16
Q
How is CPIA used for fragility assessments today?
A
Countries scoring below 3.2 or having no score are deemed fragile, and this forms the basis for the Bank’s harmonised list
17
Q
What example shows the CPIA’s limitations?
A
Mali scored above 3.2 until its sudden collapse into violence in 2012
18
Q
How is farmer-herder conflict often mischaracterised?
A
It is often labelled as jihadist when it is rooted in pastoralist grievances
19
Q
What is the core of the farmer-herder conflict?
A
Tensions between sedentary crop farming and pastoral livestock grazing
20
Q
How did decentralisation exacerbate state fragility in this context?
A
It was implemented without addressing local conflicts and institutional multiplicity
21
Q
What does FCV stand for?
A
Fragility, Conflict, and Violence
22
Q
What three conflict types are included under FCV?
A
Governance and institutional fragility, active conflict, and interpersonal or gang violence
23
Q
What are the four pillars of the FCV strategy?
A
Preventing violence, staying engaged during conflict, supporting transitions out of fragility, and mitigating spillovers
24
Q
What are the six high-priority issues in the FCV strategy?
A
Human capital, macroeconomic stability, job creation, community resilience (esp. climate), justice and rule of law, and the security sector
25
What do critics argue about how the OECD and World Bank assess 'state fragility'?
They equate it too closely with low levels of development and fail to distinguish between poor states that experience violence and those that remain peaceful
26
Why is the OECD and World Bank approach criticised for failing to differentiate between fragile and resilient states?
Because it does not account for countries like Tanzania that are peaceful despite poverty, unlike violent yet equally poor states like the DRC
27
How do persistent neoliberal views shape the OECD and World Bank’s conception of the state?
The state is seen as a necessary evil, defined only through formal institutions, and is valued mainly for creating market-friendly conditions
28
How do Putzel and Di John propose assessing states instead of typologising them?
They suggest placing states on a spectrum from fragility to resilience
29
What conditions indicate state fragility in the spectrum model by Putzel and Di John?
Armed challenges to power, limited territorial reach, identity-based spending, non-state taxation, and institutional multiplicity
30
What conditions signal state resilience according to Putzel and Di John?
Monopoly on legitimate violence, broad territorial control, nondiscriminatory taxation, and institutional hegemony
31
Why is 'state fragility' considered a temporal condition in this model?
Because states can move along the spectrum, becoming more fragile or more resilient over time
32
How does Frances Stewart distinguish 'horizontal' from 'vertical' inequalities in conflict analysis?
Horizontal inequalities are between identity-based groups and are more likely to lead to zero-sum conflict than vertical, class-based inequalities
33
What policy solution does Frances Stewart suggest for mitigating horizontal inequalities?
To reduce group-based inequalities and reframe indivisible conflicts as negotiable and divisible
34
How does Douglass North define the 'natural state'?
A condition where elites control wealth and authority to limit violence and maintain order
35
What is a 'limited access order' in Douglass North’s theory?
A system where access to political and economic power is restricted to elites, which helps maintain peace
36
What is a key limitation of Douglass North’s theory of limited access orders?
It cannot explain the stability of peaceful poor states or the success of non-democratic developmental states
37
How do Khan, Putzel, and Di John define the state in their political settlement model?
As institutions and organisations—both formal and informal—that implement rules within any regime type
38
What is a 'political settlement' according to Khan, Putzel, and Di John?
A historically rooted configuration of power in society that underpins and shapes state institutions and organisations
39
Why do Khan, Putzel, and Di John avoid using the term ‘peace agreement’ to describe political settlements?
Because political settlements are enduring power arrangements settled through coercion, persuasion, or both—not just single conflict-ending agreements
40
According to Michael Mann, what makes the state necessary in society?
Its ability to make binding rules for internal order, defense, communication, and redistribution over a defined territory
41
What does Putzel argue happens when a state ceases to function?
Society creates or re-creates state structures, as seen in Eastern DRC and Somaliland
42
What are the four sources of social power in Mann’s framework?
Military, economic, ideological, and political power
43
Which of Mann’s sources of power is unique to the state?
Political power, as it comes from the centralised and territorial regulation of society
44
How can we observe political settlements and their change over time?
By examining what powers the state and society exchange and how these powers are distributed within society
45
Why is ideological power crucial to the state’s legitimacy?
It helps legitimise state institutions and actions and shapes how people understand the state’s role
46
What makes ideology powerful in times of uncertainty?
It provides belief systems that offer meaning and certainty even if not scientifically testable
47
Which actors often hold ideological power in society?
Religious, identity-based, and political organisations
48
How do political organisations use ideological power?
By invoking nationalism, justice, or development narratives to gain or challenge state power
49
How does economic power affect the political settlement?
Through the extent to which economic elites cede power to the state and the state's control over power distribution among them
50
What forms can economic power take in society?
Control of wealth, access to rents, command over livelihoods, influence over local and foreign markets, and informal or shadow economy dominance
51
Why are economic actors significant to state power and function?
Because they influence revenue collection, aid distribution, employment, and market structures within and beyond state oversight
52
How does military power shape political settlements?
It determines whether the state can enforce rules and remain stable or if authority is contested by armed groups
53
What determines the durability of a political settlement in terms of military power?
Whether those who control violence transfer that authority to the state or retain it independently
54
What do people seek when the state fails to provide security?
They turn to non-state armed groups for protection and order
55
What are political organisations and what is their purpose?
Political organisations are formed by individuals and groups to influence or control state power at local, regional, or central levels
56
What forms can political organisations take?
Political organisations can be political parties, clan alliances, populist movements, or military or religious groups
57
Why are political organisations important to state power?
They determine how state power is managed, reinforced, and changed
58
How do political organisations shape the nature of the state?
They are built around different values and seek to implement institutions, rules, and organisational designs based on their vision of the state
59
Why is understanding political settlements important for analysing violent conflict?
Because it helps explain the root causes of violence and informs peacebuilding strategies
60
Why must peace negotiations and state-building consider political settlements?
Because the durability of peace depends on the underlying political configuration that supports the state
61
What does using the political settlements lens offer to policy?
It provides a diagnostic framework to guide effective policy interventions
62
How should states deal with rival ideological systems in a political settlement?
By incorporating or subordinating them to shape the effectiveness of reforms and service delivery mechanisms
63
Why do military interventions rarely succeed in building lasting states?
Because external actors cannot create political settlements, which emerge through internal conflict and bargaining
64
What must state organisations show to sustain a political settlement?
A credible commitment to enforcing rules and the capacity to punish non-compliance
65
Why are external actors limited in forging settlements?
Because international influence cannot substitute for internally negotiated power arrangements, as seen in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, and Palestine
66
What triggered the state collapse in Afghanistan post-2001?
The US-led invasion led to the Taliban’s flight but failed to establish a stable political settlement
67
Why did the Western-backed Afghan state fail to consolidate power?
The early exclusion of the Taliban undermined legitimacy and political cohesion
68
How was military power structured in post-2001 Afghanistan?
It was fragmented across society and reliant on foreign funding
69
What was the nature of economic power in Afghanistan between 2002–2021?
It was dominated by the poppy economy, illegal trade, and a rentier economy based on foreign aid
70
Who held ideological power in Afghanistan post-2001?
The Taliban, tribal, and local religious authorities retained influence, undermining the state
71
How was military power distributed in post-2003 Iraq?
It became fragmented and fuelled the rise of ISIS and militia polarisation
72
How was economic power structured in Iraq post-2003?
A fractured rentier system with competing elites tied to foreign corporations
73
What defined ideological power in Iraq after 2003?
It was highly divided along sectarian and regional lines
74
How is political power currently characterised in Iraq?
As fractured and persistently contested
75
How is Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 characterised?
As a war of aggression and extreme asymmetric power, violating international law
76
What was Russia’s goal in invading Ukraine?
To install a regime more favourable to its interests
77
What effect did the invasion have on Ukraine’s internal politics?
It unified the population in defence of the state under Zelensky
78
Why has Ukraine’s state survived the invasion?
Due to strong public resistance and substantial Western military support
79
Why is addressing fragility, conflict, and violence important for the World Bank Group?
Because it is essential to achieving the World Bank Group’s twin goals of ending extreme poverty and boosting shared prosperity
80
What does the World Bank Group predict about extreme poverty and FCV by 2030?
Over half of the world’s extreme poor will live in FCV-affected countries
81
What regions are most affected by fragility, conflict, and violence today?
Fragility, conflict, and violence are affecting both low- and middle-income countries, with violent conflicts at their highest levels in 30 years
82
What is one humanitarian consequence of FCV?
FCV has caused forced displacement affecting 71 million people
83
What socio-political conditions are driving instability in FCV settings?
Rising inequality, discrimination, and exclusion are fuelling grievances
84
What external pressures contribute to instability in fragile states?
Climate change, migration, technological changes, and illicit financial flows
85
What could happen if FCV is not addressed urgently?
It could reverse development progress and cause long-term damage
86
How has the World Bank Group’s approach to FCV evolved?
It shifted from post-conflict reconstruction to addressing the full spectrum of FCV challenges
87
What does the World Bank Group’s current FCV strategy include?
Engaging during conflict, supporting post-conflict transitions, and preventing regional spillovers
88
Why are legitimacy, transparency, and accountability important in FCV?
To strengthen core institutions for governance, justice, and public services
89
What is the role of private sector solutions in WBG FCV work?
To enhance economic resilience through private investment
90
How is the WBG strengthening partnerships for FCV?
By working with peacebuilding actors, regional organisations, NGOs, and institutions like the UN and IMF
91
How does the WBG manage risk in FCV settings?
Through conflict-sensitive investments and stronger risk management against corruption, instability, and ESG threats
92
How will the WBG monitor progress in FCV settings?
Through annual reports to the WBG Board, a mid-term review in 2022, and a full evaluation in 2024
93
How is the WBG investing in human capital in FCV settings?
By strengthening education, healthcare, and nutrition programs
94
How is the WBG creating jobs and economic opportunities in FCV contexts?
By supporting entrepreneurship, MSMEs, and digital solutions
95
How does the WBG build community resilience in FCV areas?
By enhancing climate adaptation, disaster preparedness, and environmental sustainability
96
What is the WBG doing to improve justice in FCV regions?
By strengthening legal institutions and conflict resolution mechanisms
97
How is the WBG addressing security sector challenges in FCV states?
By working with law enforcement to ensure peace and stability
98
What peace agreement led to the creation of the Bangsamoro Organic Law in 2018?
The Bangsamoro Organic Law was enacted following a 2014 peace agreement between the Philippine government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)
99
What long-standing conflict did the Bangsamoro Organic Law aim to resolve?
It aimed to end 50 years of armed conflict between the Philippine government and Bangsamoro rebel groups
100
What does political settlement theory introduced by Khan (1995) examine?
It examines the power configurations that underpin formal institutions and organisations of the state
101
What are formal institutions and organisations in political settlement theory?
Formal institutions are rules defining rights, while organisations are state branches enforcing those rules
102
What is Michael Mann’s theory of state power?
Michael Mann argues that societies require monopolistic rule-making authorities for governance, defense, and economic functions
103
What characterises the historical political settlement of the Philippine state?
It is built around elite families, economic liberalism, and democratic ideals, excluding Muslim Mindanao
104
What factors contributed to the Bangsamoro conflict?
Historical marginalisation, internal colonisation, Christian settlement programs, and economic displacement
105
What is the economic status of BARMM in the Philippines?
It contributes only 1.4% to GDP despite having 5% of the population and has a 61.8% poverty rate
106
What economic challenges does BARMM face?
Dominance of elite families, 80% informal economy, illicit arms/drug trade, and weak tax enforcement
107
What risks are associated with delaying BARMM parliamentary elections to 2025?
It allows MILF time to consolidate power but risks losing political legitimacy
108
What factors threaten political unity in BARMM?
Political clan alliances, untested MILF leadership, and national government oversight
109
What security threats persist in the Bangsamoro region?
Incomplete demobilisation of armed groups, ISIS-linked factions, and risk of renewed violence
110
What economic development risks exist in BARMM?
Continued dependence on subsidies, weak institutions, security concerns, and a large informal economy
111
What is military power in Mann’s theory?
The capacity for organised violence, held by state or non-state actors
112
What is economic power in Mann’s theory?
Control over resources and production, enabling political influence
113
What is ideological power in Mann’s theory?
The ability to shape beliefs and legitimise authority via religion, nationalism, or media
114
What is political power in Mann’s theory?
Centralised, territorial governance exercised solely by the state
115
Why is institutional change difficult according to political settlement theory?
Because major changes require shifts in the political settlement, which depend on conflict and bargaining
116
What are horizontal inequalities and how do they relate to conflict in Bangsamoro?
Economic, political, and social exclusion based on ethnicity or religion that fuel violent conflict
117
Which groups are most affected by horizontal inequalities in BARMM?
Muslim and Lumad communities face systemic economic and political disadvantages
118
What are rents in political economy?
Surpluses beyond what is needed for a factor of production, often generated by state policies or monopolies
119
What is the central argument of Bizhan (2018) regarding aid and state-building in Afghanistan and Iraq?
In neo-patrimonial and weak states like Afghanistan and Iraq, aid and state-building strategies significantly undermined effective state-building
120
What are the main factors that undermined state-building in Afghanistan and Iraq?
These include institutional discontinuity, creation of parallel institutions via off-budget aid, short-term priorities, and the persistence of patronage politics
121
How does Bizhan (2018) define state-building and state capacity?
State-building is creating and strengthening government institutions, while state capacity is the state's ability to implement various policies
122
What characterizes a neo-patrimonial state according to Bizhan (2018)?
It is marked by uncertainty and conflicting formal and informal rules
123
What is the difference between budget support and off-budget aid?
Budget support is aid delivered through the government’s budget or pooled funds; off-budget aid bypasses government systems and institutions
124
What were Afghanistan’s institutional conditions post-2001?
Afghanistan had limited military and administrative continuity, ethnic divisions, violent leadership removals, and a heavy reliance on foreign aid
125
How did Afghanistan’s weak institutional foundation develop over time?
Long-term instability, reliance on external support, prolonged conflict, and the Taliban’s rule left Afghanistan with minimal capacity and continuity in state structures
126
How did foreign aid affect Afghanistan’s state capacity post-2001?
Despite $52 billion in aid, mostly spent on security, high off-budget aid weakened coordination and created a parallel public sector larger than the government
127
How much aid in Afghanistan was off-budget versus on-budget in 2002?
Only $20 million was used to pay civil servants through the ARTF, while $1.8 billion went to UN agencies and NGOs via off-budget mechanisms
128
What challenges did aid coordination face in Afghanistan?
Multiple international actors and the dominance of off-budget aid created major coordination problems and undermined government systems
129
What was Iraq’s institutional legacy before and after 2003?
Even before the invasion, Iraq had weak institutions stemming from British colonial reliance on state coercion without infrastructure development, and US intervention worsened this
130
Why didn’t Iraq face a fiscal collapse like Afghanistan?
Iraq’s oil and gas revenues provided financial stability, but its low tax revenue (1% of GDP) limited state capacity
131
What is the central role of offshore companies in post-war DR Congo according to Marriage (2018)?
Offshore companies are central to Congo’s post-war political economy, enabling elite enrichment through secretive mineral trading in tax havens, yet they are largely ignored in donor frameworks
132
How did the Panama Papers expose the role of offshore firms in Congo?
They revealed direct links between these offshore companies and Congolese elites, especially President Kabila and his inner circle, highlighting their role in wealth extraction without transparency or taxation
133
How was liberalisation introduced in DR Congo and what were its consequences?
Pushed by the IMF and World Bank post-conflict without local consultation, liberalisation opened the economy to foreign investors, devalued national assets, and enriched offshore entities like those linked to Dan Gertler
134
How was aid used in relation to Congo’s economic liberalisation?
Aid was used to support liberalisation by promoting a business-friendly environment, but in practice, it facilitated elite capture and foreign domination of key sectors
135
How did elections function in post-war DR Congo according to Marriage (2018)?
Though donors treated elections as markers of democratisation, they became tools for legitimising authoritarianism, especially through repeated delays (glissement) and suppression of dissent
136
How was violence used in DR Congo’s post-war political system?
Violence took both direct forms, such as repression and killings of protestors, and structural forms like exclusion from decision-making and economic marginalisation by elites
137
What argument does Marriage make about the purpose of elections in DR Congo?
Elections were not meant to open political space but to contain unrest and legitimize the state for foreign investors while maintaining elite control
138
What is the “political marketplace” and how does it apply to DR Congo?
Based on Alex de Waal’s concept, it describes Congo’s political system as one where loyalty and positions are traded like commodities, with offshore funds fuelling this transactional politics
139
How do offshore networks sustain elite stability in Congo?
They provide capital that supports the political marketplace, allowing elites to buy loyalty and maintain control despite widespread popular discontent
140
What is Marriage’s critique of the “conflict minerals” narrative?
She argues it obscures the global political economy and offshore structures enabling elite looting, shifting blame away from international systems
141
What does Marriage (2018) argue reforms must focus on in DR Congo?
Reforms must address global trade architecture, offshore finance, and donor complicity — not just local transparency or governance at mining sites
142
What are the key takeaways from Marriage’s analysis of DR Congo?
Liberalisation does not equal democratisation, offshore networks are central to elite control, aid shaped authoritarian outcomes, and real reform must confront international systems of finance and accountability
143
What are horizontal inequalities (HIs) and how do they differ from vertical inequalities?
HIs are inequalities between culturally defined groups (ethnic, religious, racial, regional) and are multidimensional—economic, social, and political—whereas vertical inequalities are between individuals or households, measured by metrics like poverty rates or Gini coefficients
144
Why are horizontal inequalities important to development?
HIs affect well-being by shaping group identity and opportunities, reduce national output by wasting talent, and are a major driver of social instability, riots, and civil war
145
How do horizontal inequalities affect individual well-being?
People derive self-esteem from group status, so if their group is humiliated or underprivileged—as shown in Akerlof and Kranton’s work—individuals suffer emotional distress and lower utility
146
How do HIs impact development outcomes and social stability?
They reduce efficiency by excluding talent, undermine cohesion, and lead to rebellion or civil war from deprived groups or repression by dominant ones fearing loss
147
What happened in Sri Lanka when HIs were corrected poorly?
Efforts to reduce Tamil overrepresentation via language laws and quotas created new inequalities, fuelling exclusion and civil war—showing that correction must be balanced and sensitive
148
What was South Africa’s experience with HIs post-apartheid?
Despite political inclusion since 1994, economic and social inequalities from apartheid persist, with high crime possibly reflecting unresolved horizontal inequalities
149
What is the status of HIs in the United States?
Black/White disparities persist despite Civil Rights and affirmative action laws; continued income, education, and representation gaps contribute to race riots and high crime
150
What distinguishes Brazil's experience with racial HIs?
While Afro-Brazilians face large inequalities, racial identities are more fluid due to intermarriage, resulting in limited political mobilisation and modest affirmative action
151
What comparative lessons does Stewart draw from global case studies on HIs and conflict?
Conflict is likely when HIs span economic, social, and political dimensions; both deprived and dominant-but-insecure groups may spark unrest; affirmative action works if balanced and tailored
152
What is missing in current global development practice regarding HIs?
Institutions like the World Bank and IMF focus only on vertical inequality and discourage state intervention, making it hard to implement policies that reduce HIs
153
What are Stewart’s key policy recommendations for addressing HIs?
She proposes monitoring HIs via disaggregated data, affirmative action in education and jobs, anti-discrimination laws, targeted investment, inclusive political frameworks, and context-sensitive approaches
